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1. VICTIM-MEDIATION-RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THREE 
INSEPARABLE COMPONENTS. MEDIATION AS AN 
INSTRUMENT FOR VICTIM VISIBILITY 
Insofar as the intention is to provide legal protection, to speak of victims and of 
certain victims in particular, implies recalling the obscure past that enveloped them 
with regard to their invisibility in the criminal system as a whole. Society assumed the 
burden of the criminal response, through the expropriation of the victims’ rights by 
the State in the interests of that social safeguard.  
We have for centuries accepted that it was what society required –it was the conquest 
of civilization, ending “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth” and the lex talionis. 
That was the best solution, although the outcome of these responses to that situation, 
owing to frustration, disenchantment and the inoperability, on occasions, of the model 
of social response, have prompted progress towards a more active role of victims in 
the criminal response and in the modulation of that response; in other words, to go 
beyond the preventive approach, and to incorporate resocialization or the restorative 
approach.  
This would open a wider range of possibilities that should not be exclusively 
considered as previously addressed or with a particular person in mind (prevention, 
society; resocialization, the accused; reparation, victims).  
(*) Under the projects PROMETEOII 2014-081 (GV); DER 2013-44749-R (Ministry); ISIC-GV 2015, 
in Max-Planck-Institut Freiburg (by Humboldt Stipendium-Wiederaufnahme). 
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Rather, they should all imply together that society can act and assume the burden in 
the face of criminally sanctionable conduct. Undeniable steps have been taken at 
national and international centres that have implied progress towards achieving victim 
visibility.  
And that progress has necessarily to include criminal mediation, which has been 
acquiring, over recent decades, an extended scope. It is an instrument that offers 
participation in some cases and with some subjects in the search for social peace 
through a channel other than the proceedings, and through a third party other than the 
judge; and with an essential role for the victim and the victimizer when reaching an 
agreement. In any case, and despite being a different model from the procedural one, 
it only makes sense if it is linked to criminal proceedings, at least in our country and 
up until now. 
There have been many reasons that have led to its introduction in most countries, in 
some cases supported by the cultural dialogue entailed in the legal model; in others, 
because it offers efficient responses to all those involved, even the state. 
Even so, it is undeniably the pro-victim movements that have in recent decades been 
consolidating an inescapable need to protect those that have been largely forgotten in 
the punitive model: to wit, the victims, and by doing so supporting instruments such 
as mediation, with which they, the victims, may be offered the possibility of “being” 
and “staying” in the criminal justice model and achieving, if appropriate, possible 
restoration for what they have suffered; restoration which, as we suggested, may be 
plural and heterogeneous. 
In this context mediation is a further piece of the puzzle. It is neither the panacea to 
conflict solution, nor to possible reparation of the victim and the rehabilitation of 
possible criminals. Mediation is a further element of what the criminal justice system 
should mean. An affirmation that will not lead us back to our national model 
exclusively, but quite the opposite, may refer to any criminal juridical procedural 
system, even those in which, as a legal instrument for the protection of the public, it 
now consolidates.  
Ever greater approximation of the criminal justice model in democratic countries has 
given further incentive to criminal mediation. So, even by maintaining the exclusive 
sovereignty of the State in criminal matters, it is today very meaningful to observe the 
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movement towards approximation of the different legal systems in the creation of 
legal means for the protection of the public. Beyond the so-called “harmonization” of 
legislations, it is increasingly prompting their “homogenization”.  
Homogeneity that should not be understood through criteria of identity, however it 
should be understood in relation to the essential principles at stake. It is undoubtable 
that there is an increasingly stronger trend towards coordination to achieve their 
approximation.  
The protection of the public knows no boundaries today and cooperation between 
States is made smoother as countries continue approximating their model of state 
justice. Although it is true that this approximation is simpler in questions of a private, 
civil, mercantile, and commercial nature, it does not prevent it extending to legal 
settings, such as the fight against criminality and delinquency. To all of this should be 
added the role of international treaties and conventions, the extraordinary effort made 
by the European Union and the obvious influence of doctrinal movements asserting 
the protection of the weakest. Thus, it may be said that the first half of the 20th century 
was a phase in which the rights of the passive subject in the proceedings were 
asserted, owing to a need to consider the accused-defendant as a person and not as an 
object. It was in the second half of the 20th century that the relentless struggle began 
to give visibility to victims in the criminal justice system. 
These movements in support of victims arose within a specific social, political, 
economic and legal context. Hardly without realizing, but swiftly, they are implicated 
with other movements in which people have been talking about society, the state, 
globalization, international security, global security, the expansion of criminal law, 
the Criminal Law of the enemy, in the last time the “hate criminality”..., upholding, 
less so but still to some extent, silent respect for victims, now understood not as 
victims of the state or society –who also exist-, but in the experiential parameters of 
individual victims.  
They continue to be the forgotten ones. Hence, a number of decades ago, movements 
appeared that claimed the role of the victim and their visibility in criminal justice: on 
the one hand, victimology and, from there, the search for new horizons that cover the 
protection of the victim from the perspective of criminal Law, criminal policy and 
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from procedural Law, without forgetting the development of so-called Victimo-
dogmatics. 
It was in the 1970s when, in some countries with more impetus than in others, that 
movement to “rediscover” the victim began, given the state in which criminal 
prosecution left the latter. In brief, the victim lived in a legal vacuum1 which implied, 
at least, in the framework of their consideration as a person with rights, a situation of 
inferiority in the procedural setting with regard to the subjects intervening in the 
proceedings. Even though the movement to rediscover and rehabilitate the figure of 
the victim occurs especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, it slowly extends little by little 
to most European countries, initiating a line of thought that has called for a change of 
perspective, of position and location of the victim in the criminal system, which 
essentially discovers its core element in the transition from the absence to the 
presence of the victim.  
The process of making the victim visible has been a long one and even today 
positions are found, although it is undoubtable that the presence of the victim in the 
field of criminal and procedural law has also progressed in the Spanish legal system, 
probably somewhat later than it has in other countries around us2. Therefore, its own 
demarginalisation3 has been taking place, as pointed out by CANCIO MELIA, 
considering that attention to the role of the victim has to some extent been covert. Or 
                                                
1 In the English doctrine, the victim was originally called a legal nonentity, to which reference is made 
in FATTAH, E.A., “From Crime Policy to Victim Policy. The Need for a Fundamental Policy 
Change”, en Annales Internationales de Criminologie, 29 (1991), No. 112, p. 45. The same term was 
translated from the German as rechtlichen Nichts, to which reference is made in KILCHLING, M., 
Opferinteressen und Strafverfolgung, Freiburg, Edition Iuscrim (MPI), 1995, p. 1.  
2 In Spain the movement has been slower than in countries like Germany. In that country, for example, 
it was in the decade of the seventies, and particularly in 1976 when it was decided to improve the 
material situation of the victim through the approval of the Opferentschädigungsgesetz, although in the 
criminal procedural setting the victim’s situation remained unaltered until 1986, when a reappraisal of 
the victim’s role in criminal proceedings took place. An interesting evaluation on the aforementioned 
legal reform may be seen in KAISER, M., Die Stellung des Verletzten im Straverfahren. 
Implementation und Evaluation des “Opferschutzgesetzes”, Freiburg i. Br., 1992. New progress was 
made with the reform of sanctioning law through the appearance of the Täter-Opfer-Ausgleich (TOA) 
in the Novelle zum Jugendgerischtsgesetz de 1990, introducing into criminal proceedings the principle 
of opportunity, and placing the use of TOA in the specific scope of diversion measures. In 1994, the 
TOA and reparation were introduced, within the framework of substitutive sanctions, as possible ways 
of lowering the sentence or even dispensing with it (§ 46ª StGB and § 153b StPO). An interesting book 
that appeared half-way through the 1990s, a serious work in which the development and treatment in 
Germany are highlighted, with the different consequences implied by the introduction of the TOA and 
reparations on the criminal model, may be seen in KILCHLING, M., Opferinteressen und 
Strafverfolgung, cit., note 61. 
3 CANCIO MELIA, M,  Conducta de la víctima e imputación objetiva en Derecho penal. Estudio 
sobre los ámbitos de responsabilidad de víctima y autor en actividades arriesgadas, Barcelona, Bosch, 
2001, p. 24. 
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may it be said, ambushed in dogmatic institutions that are not specifically prepared for 
the problem. 
In any case, it is not a pointless discussion in any way or one that responds to a 
concrete social movement. It affects questions of great importance that impact the 
principles and foundation of all criminal systems and criminal procedures as a whole, 
as well as the penitentiary regime and the outcome of certain decisions on criminal 
policy.  
Some argue, however, that the victim in the “criminal problem” has not been 
overlooked, insofar as what is of interest, when an individual-victim is considered, is 
reparation of the damage. This has always been present in the various legal models; a 
simplistic opinion drawn from a classic conception of social punishment as the 
essential function of criminal law and from which the victim can gain nothing at all.  
Nevertheless, this has not been the opinion held by the majority, especially among 
scholars of victimology. Thus, over recent decades a lot has been written concerning 
the victim, positioning the doctrine in favour or against the presence of the victim, 
either an active presence or absence within the context of the system. A struggle 
should not be waged within that pro-victim movement for the superposition of 
subjects and rights, but instead for the integration of victim with those that already 
exist, insofar as it is not a question of “reducing” the rights of criminals to “hand them 
over” to the victims.  
It is precisely among the possible instruments that allow the legal order to integrate 
the rights of victims in the criminal model in which mediation is situated. It should be 
converted into a further element of the criminal procedural system, inspired in a will 
to negotiate and to search for the pacification of the conflict. With it, a diverse 
subjective point of view is assumed, when the model no longer turns exclusively 
around the criminal and the social response to anti-social behaviour, and accepts that 
victims are protagonists within it.  
But mediation is another piece of the puzzle. It is more than one element to consider, 
integrated in the set of measures that involve the recovery of the victims, the 
integration of their interests with those of the accused and with those of society, as 
well as the integration of preventive, resocializing and restorative functions. It is not 
therefore a matter of making the interests of some prevail over others, but of 
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generating a criminal response –a final one, in any case- that leads to a positive 
evaluation of the results, not from a short-term vision, but from the long-term 
perspective of efficiency and satisfaction. A culture of “concession” evidently has to 
be cultivated, to do so.  
Will this affect the ius puniendi of the State? There are clear legal expressions of 
these possible concessions in the Spanish legal order, which have meant that in some 
Latin-American orders they have been called exits or alternatives to the system. 
Perhaps, it should be considered that they are also part of the system, although not of 
the classic model, although they are now consolidated. 
Likewise, in consequence, as soon as the intention is to unravel the deep meaning of 
the dogma on the neutralization of the victim, in the words of TAMARIT 
SUMALLA4, which is found in surmounting self-learning, sublimation and 
rationalization of vengeful instincts, the minimization of violence, democratization of 
safety and the will to prevent the negation of the human dimension of the offender 
and, therefore, the rights of the offender, and due process, the right to a fair trial, as 
well as the option for resocialization….  
And that is how a new conception emerges based on restitutive and restorative 
philosophy, which evidently implies a new mode of reworking criminal justice. If 
differs from that which grants the possibility to the criminal of responding to victims, 
becoming responsible for the reparation of the damage that might have been caused. 
BRAITHWAITE notes, however, going much further, that it is converted into a 
different style of life, given that not only is it conceived of as a contribution to the 
reform of the criminal justice system, but that it is a means of transforming the legal 
system as a whole, our life style, our conduct in the workplace and the way our 
politicians behave5. This author therefore conceives of restorative justice as an 
intellectual and political project that is much more ambitious than it has normally 
                                                
4 TAMARIT SUMALLA, J.M., “Hasta que punto cabe pensar victomologicamente el sistema penal?”, 
in Estudios de Victimologia. Actas del I Congreso espanol de victimologia, cit., p. 31. 
5 BRAITHWAITE, J., “Principles of Restorative Justice”, in Restorative Justice &Criminal Justice. 
Competing or reconciliable paradigms?, (VON HIRSCH, A/ROBERTS,J ed), Oxford, Prtland, Hart 
Publishing, 2003, p. 1. 
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been considered6. This author begins with the conception of the need to act as 
opposed to what he calls “preventive injustice”7. 
There are, nevertheless, those that consider in the doctrine that retributive justice and 
reparative or restitutive are both species of distributive justice. Both are generally 
proposed as ways of acknowledging in an intelligible way the moral meaning of 
individual autonomy. This leads us to consider that through these species the 
distribution of existing rights are redistributed before the facts occur, insofar as may 
be possible8. The substitution by one of the other is not the aim, but rather the effort to 
arrive at an integral view of retributive and restitutive justice9.  
In this way, it does include that acknowledgement of the distribution of existing rights 
before the facts occur, all the more so when through restorative justice a negative 
legal consequence is also imposed on the perpetrator of the criminal acts. This might 
consist of returning what was robbed, an expression of remorse, economic 
compensation of the victims, but in all cases, a consequence that has a clearly 
retributive effect10.  
Precisely because restorative justice is a form of retribution, it therefore becomes 
essential to find a moral justification, as well as to subject it to a profound legal 
reform that delimits in extenso its nature and the intensity of restorative justice11. 
In reality, reworking criminal justice in that way is nothing but an echo from the past, 
in as much as the separation of civil from criminal proceedings implied the 
subordination of the individual interests under consideration to the public interest, in 
such a way that over the centuries, the separation between both rose to a crescendo, 
making it unthinkable to consider reparation of the victim alongside criminal or 
procedural efficacy.  
                                                
6 BRAITHWAITE, J., “Principles of Restorative Justice”, cit., p. 18. He also stresses added value that 
turns it into a path to encourage the public to respect and to believe in justice. 
7 BRAITHWAITE, J., “Principles of Restorative Justice…, cit., p. 5. 
8 WATSON/BOUCHERAT/DAVIS, “Reparation for retributivists”, in Victims, offenders and 
community (WRIGHT/GALAWAY), London, Sage Publications, 1989, p. 220. 
9 SHERMAN, L.W/STRANG.H., Restorative justice: the evidence, London, The Smith Institute, 2007, 
p. 52.  
10 Likewise, the English doctrine DUFF, A., “Restoration and Retribution”, in Restorative Justice & 
Criminal Justice. Competing or reconciliable paradigms?, (VON HIRSCH, A/ROBERTS, J ed), cit., 
p. 54. 
11 In similar terms see DIGNAN, J., “Towards a Systemic Model of restorative Justice: Reflections on 
the Concept, its Context and the Need for Clear Constraints”, in Restorative Justice &Criminal Justice. 
Competing or reconciliable paradigms?, (VON HIRSCH, A/ROBERTS,J ed), cit., p. 138. 
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It was well into the 20th century when reparation as a way of reducing the sentence or 
as a possible reason for dismissal of the proceedings began, at least timidly, to be 
introduced, even though in practice that possibility was more theoretical than real12. 
However, over the passage of time, certain changes have been taking place, which 
have supported the recuperation and de-neutralization of the victim, and the 
resurgence of reparation, the emergence of compensation in criminal policy. So, a 
firm commitment now exists in the doctrine and in criminological movements in 
support of restorative justice, which responds to a doctrinal effort of integration, both 
of victims and perpetrators of criminal acts as well as of the community and society, 
and even Criminal Law itself and its “reinterpretation” in the light of the 
incorporation of restorative justice in its various manifestations13.  
It is not the case, as some authors have made clear, that the offence, no longer a social 
offence, turns into nothing more than an individual conflict, the revival of the victim’s 
interests against the backdrop of the disappearance of social interest, but rather the 
coexistence of both in relation to certain facts and conducts that are sanctioned in the 
Penal Code.  
This has also reminded certain authors of a Platonic dialogue which, in addition, may 
undoubtedly entail a significant moral message that, in short, confuses law and 
morals. This has some foundation, if it is assumed that there are certain roots of 
restorative justice in religious beliefs (reference is made to concepts such as guilt, 
mistrust, and separation, which may be surmounted in an atmosphere of recovery 
founded on communication). Hence, links are made to Judaic theology, to Christianity 
and to the philosophy of Confucius14.  
                                                
12 An interesting reflection on the history and evolution over the centuries in the German model, and 
special reference to the 20th century may be seen in STEFFEN, M., Der Tater-Opfer-Ausgleich und die 
Wiedergutmachung. Historische Bezuge und moderne Ausgestaltung, Aachen, Shaker Verlag, 2005, 
especially pp. 61-62. 
13 These questions developed ad extensum and a real effort to integrate these concepts through the 
application of restorative justice in DOMENIG, C., Restorative Justiceund integrative Symbolik. 
Moglichkeiten eines integrativenUmgangs mit Kriminalitat und die Bedeutung von Symbolik in dessen 
Umsetzung, Bern/Stuttgart/Wien, Ed. Haupt, 2008, especially, p. 138-152. 
14 HIGHTON/ÁLVAREZGREGORIO, Resolución alternativa de disputas y sistema penal, cit., p. 79-
80. These authors consider that for Confucius the best solution to a disagreement was achieved by 
moral persuasion and agreement, more than by coercion; moreover, the prophets of the Old Testament 
were those that solved conflicts, without overlooking the role of the apostles in the New Testament, the 
apostles, who expressed the need to solve conflicts within the congregation instead of bringing them 
before secular courts.  
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In brief, following this conceptual foundation, it appears to advocate a more 
humanitarian idea of justice. This idea has greater acceptance in certain communities 
or marginal groups, opposed to systems of state governance, owing to their 
consideration that the imposition of power is illegitimate and, therefore, the measures 
and consequences of the application of classic criminal justice offers no guarantees of 
any sort to them. Restorative justice programmes have worked very well with such 
groups, especially among Maori, Eskimo and Aborigine communities in New 
Zealand, Canada and Australia, and among marginal groups in the U.S.A., with highly 
satisfactory results, because they include the group or the community’s own elements, 
converting the dialogue and consensus into mechanisms that seek to give the system 
greater credibility.  
Together with that pacifist philosophy coming from other cultures and a religious 
conception, it is undeniable that standpoints found in labelling theory or the 
implications of the abolitionist or the minimalist philosophies of criminal law, even of 
the most radical critical criminology, have necessarily brought a certain degree of 
change into the criminal model that could bring a less reductionist and more 
integrative philosophy of the individual into criminal justice. This inspiration, 
however, was not so much to do with the survival of both interests, but more to do 
with placing the interests of victims over and above social interests; it was thought 
that social interests had been highly protected and individuals, citizens, people had 
been forgotten.  
Its first impulse, to defend elements of restorative justice and the mediation process, 
was nothing other than to run away from criminal law as it had been conceived, as a 
repressive law. The incorporation of criminal responses in a less aggressive, less 
repressive, and more constructive ideology, was seen later on as a -negative- 
possibility of the expansion of criminal law. So, in the beginning, although the 
criminal law minimalists and abolitionists looked favourably upon criminal 
mediation, their position changed, when they considered that these instrumental 
means of dialogue and pacification also assisted the maximization of the criminal 
response. 
The acceptance of these manifestations of restorative justice reached a highpoint in 
common-law countries. It was given significant impetus at the end of the 1970s in the 
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U.S.A.15, since when it has not ceased to expand and to defend itself against various 
national and international bodies. So-called conferencing or circles in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand should also be mentioned, which were intended to 
conciliate specific practices of the Aborigines with an interest in providing a solution 
to the conflict that would be positive for both victim and offender16. These 
experiences sought to incorporate greater participation of the community in 
procedural modality, beyond the victim and the perpetrator (circle of people), offering 
participation to these specific groups and communities, and integrating them in 
society. The projects were followed by various European initiatives, especially those 
belonging to the common-law model, and more particularly in England and Wales17, 
and subsequently in Germany18, France19, Norway Finland20, although with different 
objectives and also with varying results. 
In brief, it should be affirmed that, in reality, restorative justice came about as a result 
of a set of experimental programmes –in their majority in the world of juvenile 
delinquency and in conflicts that could involve groups and communities- which 
sought responses to the weaknesses and the limitations of existing criminal justice. 
The aim of those programmes was precisely to assess the application of these 
reparative concepts and the positive and negative effects that they could provoke in 
the subjects and in the system.  
Precisely for that reason it is very curious to observe that, sooner or later, the 
incorporation of restorative justice in all countries occurs as a consequence of pilot-
projects and not as a consequence of legislative changes or previous jurisprudence. 
But in all of them, victim or victims and mediation are intrinsically linked, whence the 
need to give visibility to these subjects, “the others”, the invisible ones in the criminal 
“case”, and to do so through various criminal procedural channels as well as other 
                                                
15 ZEHR, H., “Justice paradigma shift? Values and visions in the reform process”, Mediation 
Quarterly, vol. 12, n. 3, 1995, Jossey Bass Publishers, p. 207 to 216. 
16 BAZEMORE, G/UMBREIT, M., “A Comparison of four Restorative Conferencing Models”, in 
Juvenile Justice Bulletin, Department of Federal Justice of EUA, February 2001, pp. 1 and ff. 
17 MONTESINOS GARCIA, A., “Mediacion penal en Inglaterra y Gales”, in Mediación penal para 
adultos. Una realidad en los ordenamientos jurídicos, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2009, p. 85-124. 
18 A specific section is dedicated to developments of the German doctrine infra. 
19 BONAFÉ-SCHMITT, J.P., “Alternatives to the judicial model”, in Mediation and criminal justice. 
Victims, offenders and community (WRIGHT/GALAWAY), cit., pp. 178-194. Also, see 
ETXEBERRIA GURIDI, F., “El modelo francés de mediación penal”, in Mediacion penal para 
adultos, cit., p. 181-234. 
20 DAVIS, G., Mediation and reparation in Criminal Justice, Routledge, 1992, p. 16.; and  In ERVO, 
L., “Mediación en los países escandinavos”, in Mediación penal para adultos, cit., pp. 125-180. 
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procedures that attend to the different asymmetries of the facts-subjects that might 
intervene. Mediation is an instrument to fulfil restorative justice within the framework 
of the legal protection of citizens, and especially the citizens that are victims of 
criminal acts.   
  




Mediation is not a process but an extrajurisdictional procedure, by virtue of which the 
victim and offender voluntarily acknowledges the capacity to participate in the 
resolution of “their” criminal conflict, which exists. With the intervention of a third 
party, the mediator, this re-establishes the earlier situation of the crime and respect for 
the legal order, as well as giving satisfaction to the victim and the acknowledgement 
of such activity by the victimizer.  
It is a means of conflict management, instrumentalized through dialogue and 
supporting the reconstruction of social peace broken by the criminal act, which 
minimizes state violence and, in consequence, returns a leading role to civil society.  
All in all, it is undoubtable that it will lead to increased trust in the justice 
administration. Its incorporation entails an inflection of the classic conception of 
criminal justice, insofar as the idea of “conflict” appears once again, of subjects that 
participate in its composition –victim and victimizer-, the main actors; through it, 
priority is given to the reparation of damage and the special prevention over general 
prevention and retribution21. 
Finally, it is the State itself that gives up part of the prosecution of behaviours through 
the intervention and collaboration of subjects involved in the criminal offence. This 
neither affects the principle of the exclusivity of criminal jurisdiction, nor the state 
monopoly over ius puniendi, given that the courts will control the results of mediation 
and those which, where applicable, will or will not attribute juridical efficacy to what 
is agreed through mediation. It is therefore turned into a means to respond to 
criminality. The elements that will allow us to naturalize mediation are as follows: 
 
                                                
21 See these points in BARONA VILAR, S. Mediación Penal. Fundamento, fines y régimen jurídico, 
Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch, 2011. 
Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Silvia Barona Vilar 
University of Valencia (Spain) 
 
1º) Mediation is a modality for the legal protection of the citizen. Together with legal 
protection, the legal order more or less develops or should develop an interesting 
range of protective modalities that are more or less structured and/or regulated by 
specific regulations. The variables are very large, within the state and regional 
framework, but mediation is one of these modalities. Even with its limitations also in 
criminal matters, we should turn to mediation as an instrument in the exercise of 
freedom22. 
2º) Mediation is based on liberty or the free will of the parties to submit to it. This 
means that those who come to criminal mediation -victim and offender- freely do so, 
which means neither corruption nor coercion.  
This note raises certain confusion with the affirmation of the principle of officialdom 
that governs the law. The question of whether mediation should be a chosen option 
for the parties, avoiding the criminal process, avoiding the penal process, or whether 
such a decision was needed it should be the result of a prior recommendation of those 
that assume control of the criminal recommendation in the legal order.  
Thus, it has to be determined whether a person is referred to mediation by the judge or 
the prosecutor, according to the model and the procedural moment in question, or 
whether there may be a possibility of the same subjects that are involved, deciding 
whether or not to follow this procedure.  
In some legal orders, exclusive attribution, with regard to the initiation of the 
mediation procedure, is given to the prosecutor, as happens in the example of 
France23. It appears more coherent with the essential principles that characterize the 
exercise of ius puniendi of the state that the parties be referred to mediation by the 
director of the criminal proceedings. However, in order not to frustrate possible 
initiatives of the parties, which might be accepted in the framework of the search for 
                                                
22 All of which, assuming that the option of absolute liberty is not possible in criminal matters, 
although the legal order may establish channels that differ from the integral and exclusive criminal 
procedure, which precisely support, complement and strengthen it. It is undoubtable that, at present, 
with a single criminal channel –criminal proceedings- the model, as it was basically set up in the 19th 
century, is exhausted, has no more to give of itself, and needs, as well as substantial procedural 
reforms, the incorporation of other techniques and procedures to complement it. Criminal mediation 
can be turned into the best ally of this new model of criminal justice, an interesting procedure to give 
greater credibility to the justice system. I would stress that it is a procedural instrument that serves the 
proceedings, it is an instrument of criminal protection, which is why I consider that the procedure of 
mediation is the instrument of the instrument.  
23 On the French model, see ETXEBERRIA GURIDI, J.F., “El modelo francés de mediación penal”, in 
the collective works La mediación penal para adultos, (Ed. BARONA VILAR), cit., pp. 200-201. 
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social peace and credibility in the system, a possible intermediary situation could be 
upheld in which, even at the proposal of the parties, should represent the final official 
decision on whether or not to move on to the mediation process.  
One model that could be extrapolated to the Spanish legal order is, in this sense, the 
German one, which establishes that, in principle, the Prosecutor should decide on the 
advisability to refer the case to mediation or, on the contrary, to uphold the accusation 
in the criminal proceeding. However, the court can in the same way decide to refer the 
case to mediation, provided that the accusation has yet to be formalized: in the pre-
trial phase (art. 153a.1, 1 and 5 of the StPO and art. 45.2 and 3 Penal Code of minors). 
There would even be a possibility in the trial phase, of the judge suspending the 
hearing and referring the parties to mediation (art. 155a of the StPO).  
Thus, the regulation in Germany does all it can, so that reparation can avoid the public 
interest in the prosecution of the facts and the subsequent, foreseeable criminal 
conviction. The possibility has also been raised in the German order of the police 
selecting the cases to take to mediation, although with various detractors. And what 
happens if it is officially or unofficially agreed between the parties? Without negating 
the viability of the idea, the question centres on the value that can be given to the 
agreement adopted in mediation24, leaving the juridical-procedural efficacy of that 
agreement for the prosecutor and the judge to accept, who will assess whether they to 
decide to continue with the proceeding or, on the contrary, to dismiss it25. 
3º) Mediation is a procedure, not a proceeding. Even though proceeding and 
procedure have the same etymological root in Latin (prōcēdere), procedure exists in 
any legal activity, which is the formal way in which it is carried forward, and 
proceeding refers only to the exercise of the function of judging and enforcing 
judgments in an irrevocable way, which is nothing other than the jurisdictional 
function (art. 117.3 CE).  
                                                
24 This denomination is that given in Germany to these possible criminal mediations, which take place 
with the bilateral agreement of the victim and the perpetrator to accept mediation, and not by referral 
from an organ of public prosecution. 
25 BANNENBERG, Britta, Wiedergutmachung in der Strafrechtspraxis. Eine empirisch-
kriminologische Untersuchung von Täter-Opfer-Ausgleichsprojekte in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Bonn, Forum Verlag Godesberg, 1993, p. 23-24. See also the author’s chapter “Situacion 
de la justicia restaurativa y la mediacion penal en Alemania“, in the collective work La mediación 
penal para adultos, (Ed. BARONA VILAR), cit., p. 268-270. 
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In the case of mediation, we are not facing a jurisdictional function, as the mediator 
does not act in a heterocompositive way supra partes, but autocompositively or intra 
partes. The decision of the mediator is not imposed, unlike the judge exercising a 
jurisdictional function through the proceedings.  
Instead, the mediator works with the parties, bringing them together, helping them to 
define their positions and their interests, which are not always the same; a task that is 
performed on the basis of neutrality, winning over the confidence of the parties as the 
procedure advances and without the formal ties of a judicial proceeding.  
This procedure is not ended with a decision that is imposed by the mediator, but 
through a written agreement, which makes known whether or not an agreement was 
reached between the parties upon its conclusion, without any reference to a binding 
decision with the effect of a firm judgment (res iudicata).  
That is no obstacle to the need to give legal power to the outcome of the activity, all 
the more so if it is a question of the result of a pact of consensus, given the legal 
consequences that might ensue if they were incorporated into the relevant criminal 
proceedings. That incorporation into the proceedings and its subsequent homologation 
is what will convert the result of the mediation into a judicial decision, with its 
corresponding procedural efficacy. 
It is essential that this procedure be flexible and not very formal, which does nothing 
to prevent the definition of rules in the procedure that involve such guarantees as, for 
example, the establishment of timeframes. It should likewise respect essential rights 
to equality, contradiction, defence and the presumption of innocence, in such a way 
that these qualities of informality, flexibility and non-rigidity are no more than a way 
of proceeding that assists the essential principle of the intervention of the parties 
within mediation in any modality of protection that is really effective for the public26. 
The guarantees should be present so that, as VON SCHLIEFFEN27 considers, 
mediation should not be considered a channel that counters classic criminal justice or 
a solution that enters into competition with criminal proceedings, but one that is 
equally inscribed in the essence of justice.  
                                                
26 TRANKLE, S., Im Schatten des Strafrechts, cit., p. 43. 
27 VON SCHLIEFFEN, K., “Mediation im Rechtsstaat –Chancen einer neuen Konfliktordnung”, in 
HAFT, F./VON SCHLIEFFEN, K. (ed), Handbuch Mediation, Manchen, 2002, p. 176. 
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4) It is a perfect complement to the criminal proceeding. It appears reasonable to think 
of that need to integrate mediation into the criminal justice model28, which means one 
can not be absolutely free when defining the mediation model that is wanted, but 
rather that it should necessarily be made conditional upon the subsequent criminal 
proceeding, or on one that is pending, or one that has already ended, or with the 
enforcement of the criminal conviction.  
In consequence, although the efficacy of a criminal mediation procedure can come to 
change the development of a criminal proceeding, it can minimize it or it can suspend 
it and even transform the content of the criminal conviction in the proceedings. That 
is not to say that we face an alternative channel, but, quite the contrary, a 
complementary instrument of the courts.  
Obviously this principle links directly in to others such as official participation or 
control, whether by referral from the judge or the prosecutor, or by the same judicial 
control over the agreement reached in mediation.  
All in all, there is no change for the substitution of one model by another29, however 
there is a “more or less peaceful” coexistence of both systems, the retributive model 
having a greater presence, especially with regard to its organization and development. 
Attention must be paid, in this case, to the essential idea: to assess and to ponder what 
both, victim and offender, will reciprocally receive. Thus, the possible reduction or 
transformation of the legal consequence for perpetrating the act is directly 
proportional to the possible benefit that the victim may obtain through a reparative 
mechanism, either morally or materially.  
Thus, mediation entails a change in the model of social reaction to the offence, but not 
a negation of the existing model. Quite the opposite, it demands what some authors 
have called in the doctrine the model of cooperation, the product of the sociological 
concept of reflexive law, which should lead to both functions living together as 
                                                
28 On that need for the integration of concepts and their legal incorporation and in criminal policy on 
restorative justice, and with it the need for criminal mediation, see the work by DOMENIG, C., 
Restorative Justice und integrative Symbolik. Moglichkeiten eines integrativen Umgangs mit 
Kriminalitat und die Bedeutung von Symbolik in dessen Umsetzung, Bern/Stuttgart/Wien, Haupt ed., 
2008. In general, the whole work is a proposal for integration, although for points raised here, pp. 324-
326 are of special interest. 
29 Despite the consideration by some authors, such as la vía penal del siglo XXI, GALAWAY, B., 
“Prospects”, in Mediation and Criminal Justice (Victims, Offenders and Community), 
(WRIGHT/GALAWAY, ed), Bristol, 1989, p. 275.  
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perfect bedfellows, determining the criteria that should serve to go to one or another 
channel.  
Moreover, as WALGRAVE30 points out, this model of integrated justice is only 
possible in the legal order and as a response of the state, and that insofar as “if the 
state disappears, there would be no rights, depending in each case on the goodwill of 
others, or on one’s own capacity to compete against others and, in this case, in order 
to oppress them. If only states existed, there would be no trust, and the others would 
be considered rivals, a threat to their own territory. All states would end by falling 
into anarchy or tyranny.”  
5º) Mediation is founded on the tripartite intervention of subjects: they find 
themselves in a linear position in their behaviour, without the mediator or neutral and 
impartial third party standing over the subjects that resort to this procedure.  
Thus, on the one hand, victim and person that has suffered the consequences of the 
offence and victimizer that is the presumed perpetrator of the criminal acts.  
And, on the other hand, between them, is the mediator, who is the person that will try 
to approximate the victim and victimizer, so that they can explain arguments that can 
reach a solution to a situation generated by the possible commission of the criminal 
act.  
The success of mediation is necessarily the opportunity it gives to subjects to be 
heard, and the techniques for contradiction will vary accordingly: through 
simultaneous dialogue or face-to-face confrontation, or successively on a one-to-one 
basis.  
Equally, linked to this idea of the subjective tripartite formulation of this mediation 
procedure is the requirement for mediator neutrality31, which reflects the need of the 
third party that intervenes to do so with criteria of impartiality, in other words, not to 
favour one of the parties over and above the other32.  
Rather than being a mere spectator, on the contrary, this implies meeting the parties, 
calming angry moods, acting as an impartial guide in the discussion and ensuring that 
                                                
30 WALGRAVE, L., “Imposing Restoration Instead of Inflicting Pain: Reflections on the judicial 
reaction to crime”, in Restorative Justice &Criminal Justice. Competing or reconciliable paradigms?, 
(VON HIRSCH, A/ROBERTS,J ed), cit., p. 76. 
31 TRANKLE, S., Im Schatten des Strafrechts, cit., p. 43 and 64-66. 
32 DI CHIARA, Scenari processuali per l’intervento di mediazione: Una panoramica sulle fonti, in 
Rivista italiana di Diritto e Procedura Penale, fascícolo 2, April-June, 2004, p. 501 and ff. 
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everybody has the same opportunities to speak. It even means, at all times respectful 
of the requirement for confidentiality in support of the mediator’s neutrality, that 
information may be transmitted from one to the other, adapting what is expressed by 
each party from a negative to a positive language.  
It is equally possible for third parties to intervene in the mediation process 
collaborating with either, being neither victim nor victimizer, without that upsetting 
the idea of bilateralism.  
Asymmetry has to be avoided that can be generated as a consequence of any 
participation of third parties, which means due caution should be taken. 
Communication is relevant, and in certain cases the intervention of the legal counsel 
of the subjects that go to mediation, and especially the lawyer of the possible 
victimizer, given that even when the possible intervention of counsel in the procedure 
is still questioned, it is undeniable that the presence of counsel should be permitted, 
all the more so if procedural legal validity is accorded to the mediation agreement, 
which might affect the victimizer’s legal and procedural situation.  
6) Grounded in the principle of confidentiality. This principle is the essence of 
mediation, such that the debates, affirmations or allegations made by the parties 
should not be shared with the judge, who will only receive the final document, which 
is something like a signed record of the agreements that have or have not been 
reached between the parties.  
This is the reason why, after the corresponding information has been shared with the 
parties on what going to mediation actually means, with its consequences and 
connections with the criminal proceeding, the mediator will ask them to sign a 
confidentiality statement.  
This maintains the possibility that at any time either of the parties may abandon the 
mediation and return to the criminal proceedings, without the information shared in 
confidence by the parties to mediation having any incriminatory value at all; logically 
of course unless both agreed to use certain affirmations, expressions or statements 
made by them either orally or in writing as evidence.  
The contrary would mean a clear attack on the right to the presumption of innocence 
(art. 24 SC), and would –obviously- provoke great suspicion in the presumed offender 
towards participation in the mediation process. Although, when it is affirmed that the 
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parties might be in agreement in taking the documentation to the proceedings, it 
should be done by both and not unilaterally33, otherwise it would lose all sense. 
Likewise, as a consequence of the above, the mediator may never be called to the 
proceedings as either a witness or an expert witness, and remains exempt from the 
duty of reporting a crime as a consequence of professional secrecy.  
7) Mediation should be free accepted. I understand that it should be free owing to the 
public nature of criminal law, with due respect to the principle of equality expressed 
in article 14 of the Constitution.  
Were it otherwise, we would establish models for the rich and models for the poor, 
institutions that are more beneficial or less so in accordance with the economic 
resources of the parties to the proceedings and, in short, we would turn mediation into 
an instrument that supports two tier criminal proceedings.  
Another question related to these considerations is the possibility of perverse practices 
that might be associated with proceedings that are declared free, with a view to opting 
for those procedures voluntarily, which, precisely because they are free, could lead to 
the prolongation of the criminal proceedings.  
The legislator will, where applicable, determine exceptions, arising from fraudulent 
conduct, which entail an economic cost and are exceptions to the principle of free 
public services. 
 
3. LIMITS OR NOT LIMITS BY MEDIATION 
One of the questions raised in the doctrine and in criminal policy concerns the 
determination of limits to mediation.  
Mediation, the participation of victims within it, the incorporation of reparation for 
juridical-penal consequences, either as the alleviation of the crime or as a tertium 
genus between measures and sentences, raises some questions. Are there no limits? Is 
it possible to go to mediation and participate in mediation, whoever the victims and 
whatever the criminally sanctionable acts? Should this be limited in the legal order 
limit?  
                                                
33 GONZALEZ CANO, I., “La mediación penal en España”, in the collective work La mediación penal 
para adultos, (Ed. BARONA VILAR), cit., p. 33-34. 
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The solutions that are found in other legal orders can throw some light on possible 
positions, although, beforehand, I should make it clear that in my opinion, seeking to 
separate favourable and unfavourable circumstances, or legally established limits is 
extremely complex. In any case, it would offer an excessively rigid solution that 
would leave out other situations that are not recommendable and would exclude 
others that might nevertheless be recommendable.  
One of the most commonly heard opinions concerns the severity of the act. When the 
facts are considered serious, it is not recommendable that victims work in mediation 
with possible authors. In this case, far from considering the victims, it is only the 
merely objective criterion that is assessed: i.e. offences that merit a severe sentence.  
This criterion, however, does not always respond to the question of why or why not 
mediation. If the answer that is put forward here is that the juridical-penal 
consequence is paramount and social censure is so great that it is not possible to 
incorporate criteria on reparation and resocialization, then it may be justified.  
But we know all too well that there are, on occasions, really atrocious facts, meriting 
severe punishment. This has happened with crimes of terrorism, in which the victims 
have suffered harm because of the loss of a loved one and the way in which that 
happened, involving a very negative emotional component34. These have, however, 
recently been the object of mediation, not with the purpose of resocialization or 
reformulation of the sentence, but of the internal “reconstitution” of the victims and of 
those convicted. We face very complex sentences, but in which the victims 
themselves have voluntarily accepted to form part of those mediation projects in a 
prison. 
Another criterion that has been used is the criminal modality or if you prefer the 
protected legal good. Accordingly, certain acts, misdemeanours or offences are more 
likely to lead to mediation. Offences against patrimony are mentioned here, as well as 
bodily harm, offences against freedom such as threats or coercion, defamation such as 
slander and libel, and offences against the family rights and obligations such as non-
payment of maintenance, and likewise offences against public health could be 
included. It is not always true and on occasions, as in the case of offences against 
                                                
34 BARONA VILAR, S., “Mediation post sententiam bei terroristischen Straftaten“, Zeitschrift für die 
gesamte Strafwissenschaftrecht, De Gruyter, dezember, 2015. 
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public order, the public interest that is at stake is greater than in other types of 
offences.  
It is true that in these cases the victims may have a greater willingness to mediate with 
the possible perpetrators of the act, but that should not necessarily be so. In some 
cases, those that assume that point of view are paying attention to cases in which the 
proceedings are concluding because of a agreed sentence and there are, therefore, 
agreements. But the victims do not intervene in the agreed sentences, which is why it 
should not be forgotten that the subjective factor should be considered alongside the 
objective factor.  
It has been sustained that certain circumstances have been called into question in 
countries where a legal tradition exists around mediation, largely because of the 
preferential consideration of the subjects: in some cases by victimizers and in others, 
by victims. So: 
-In the cases of mediation with repeat offenders, it has been sustained that such a 
possibility should be rejected. Mediation is “a goodness” that is attributed in the legal 
order to those with a willingness to change, so –they sustain- it makes no sense to 
favour those that repeat the offence.  
If the idea is found within this argument that mediation will gratify whoever decides 
to change, with the hefty paternalistic component that it entails, it may happen that, 
with a view to the expansion of criminal law, a person who is not necessarily a 
habitual criminal might become a repeat offender whose punishable criminal acts 
might not even affect that same legal good. Establishing a regulation would be too 
rigid to respond to the possible casuistry and above all could prevent the victim from 
going to mediation in these cases. 
-In the so-called offences of danger, when collective legal goods are protected. 
It has been argued that in this case there are nameless or collective victims and that it 
is not possible to “sit them down” at the mediation table.  
The experience of Anglo-Saxon countries allows us to say that this is possible and 
that in these cases what has been called the symbolic victim appears, who may be 
represented by associations, groups, and entities that defend and protect the collective 
interests that are at stake.  
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-Another of the circumstances that raises doubts about the viability of mediation 
is the plurality of subjects, those cases in which various people are found alongside 
the victims and various other people alongside the defendants.  
The complex circumstances of the question are undeniable, which involve different 
techniques the results of which, in case of an agreement, will generate evident 
diversity and asymmetry. Does this mean that they should be excluded from 
mediation? I do not believe so.  
It means that it will be more difficult to go to mediation, because they must all be 
willing to do so. Mediation should serve to restrict or even limit the objective of the 
proceedings, both with regard to the criminal acts in the accusation and with regard to 
those responsible for them.  
It is not a matter of arranging the instrumentality of mediation in the proceedings, as 
happens in civil mediation, however it should be valued, under the assumption that all 
the subjects were in agreement to go to mediation, thereby minimizing the complexity 
that the proceedings might entail. 
-Mediation is questioned with victims who are minors, people living with 
disabilities, elderly people, etc.  
In this case, the reason is found in their vulnerability. The need for the equilibrium of 
the parties in the mediation procedure is undeniable and perhaps in cases such as the 
one that concerns us here, this situation remains open to debate.  
It is no obstacle to the thought that they can intervene in the criminal proceedings in 
much the same way that they can “avail themselves” of the people that complement 
their capacities and guide them, or help them. It is very probably one of the cases in 
which the judges or prosecutors will exclude them from mediation, due to the intrinsic 
vulnerability that they possess, which would call into question the real meaning of 
mediation that might provoke a greater feeling of vulnerability, were it possible.   
-Another of the circumstances for which mediation has been refused is in cases 
of gender violence. This exclusion is supported in our legal order under LO 1/2004, of 
28 December, on Measures of Integral Protection against Gender Violence, in which 
article 44.5 prohibits it. What is the reason in this case?  
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Evidently, it is understood that equality does not exist, because the victim is made to 
submit to the victimizer with a significant emotional dependency in the majority of 
cases. It is evident that many of the circumstances in which these arguments arise are 
precisely so. However, I could understand certain exceptions to this imperative 
regulation of exclusion, given that it could be useful (provided that equality –the will 
of the victim- may be guaranteed) under the circumstances of distancing orders as a 
sentence, when it is question of episodic or isolated violence. It would, to my mind, 
be a decision that should be upheld through a case-by-case assessment, in order to 
avoid for the legal protection of the victim of gender violence, the instrumentalization 
of the victim in the name of gender justice, preventing access to other channels or 
avenues that other victims might have. 
In conclusion, I understand that we are at a great crossroads in which it has some time 
ago been possible, to reach absolutely unimaginable heights when seeking to reassert 
the visibility of the victims in criminal protection and to achieve once again a sort of 
de-expropriation of their rights with regard to the State.  
However, the incorporation of the victim in the proceeding, in criminal law, 
especially through reparative justice, and in mediation, is reaching contrary extremes.  
That the legislator should almost convert victims into an object, defining and 
classifying them, and limiting, restricting or expanding the use of their rights, to the 
style of “Brave New World” by A. Huxley, can be nothing other than very worrying.  
Of course, with regard to mediation, in my opinion, it should not be limited in legal 
terms, but instead let those that live the experience of “criminal prosecution” in the 
social and democratic state be the ones that recommend or otherwise the possible 
referral of “those” victims to mediation.  
On the basis of that referral, the essential work will be in the hands of the criminal 
mediator who should demonstrate capability and skill not only to be a “mediator” but 
to be a “good mediator”, knowledgeable of the law that underpins the task.  
